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NOTE 
WHAT DOES DIVERSITY 
MEAN IN SEATTLE?: 
PARENTS INVOLVED IN 
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V. 
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NUMBER 1 STRIKES DOWN THE 
USE OF A RACIAL TIEBREAKER 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education, public school districts were constitution-
ally permitted to segregate based on race.' Under the "separate 
but equal" doctrine, substantially equal facilities, although 
separate, were considered equal treatment: In Brown, the dis-
puted Kansas statute permitted, but did not require, separate 
school facilities for black and white students! The Court con-
sidered the impact of public education on American life and 
found it to be one of the most important functions of state and 
local governments .. Accordingly, it described education as "the 
very foundation of good citizenship."· As a result, the Court 
held that the doctrine of "separate but equal" had no place in 
, Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). 
2Id. at 488 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896». 
3Id. at 486. 
• Id. at 492-93. 
• Id. at 493. 
51 
1
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the field of public education because students would be de-
prived equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.6 
Despite Brown's groundbreaking decision, schools did not 
become integrated simultaneously with the ruling:' The deci-
sion in Brown illustrated a desire to change, but when combat-
ing many years of racial discrimination, a mere desire to 
change was not enough.6 The courts attempted to remedy the 
problem with court ordered desegregation through injunctions.9 
Today, educational and professional institutions have evolved 
beyond equitable injunctions by establishing affirmative action 
polices.'o 
However, over fifty years later, our educational system 
still displays significant remnants of past discrimination. 11 The 
standard of living for blacks in the United States still resem-
bles the pre-1970 levels." Although there were immediate 
gains in education as a direct result of Brown, many of those 
gains have since been lost.'3 Children of color, particularly Af-
rican Americans and Latinos, often attend substantially segre-
gated and poorly funded primary and secondary schools." Al-
though many African Americans' access to better education has 
improved since Brown, the desire for an integrated society con-
tinues to be an aspiration rather than a reality.'5 
The Seattle School District (hereinafter "School District") 
is an illustration of a racially segregated school system in the 
United States today.'6 Seattle's housing patterns create 
• Id. at 495 (reasoning that if one race was inferior socially, then the Constitu-
tion could not put the two races on the same plane). 
7 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (setting forth broad guidelines to 
desegregate). 
8 See generally Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(permitting school district to rearrange student busses to desegregate the school sys-
tem). 
9Id. I. See infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text. 
11 Linda Carty & Paula C. Johnson, The Impact of Brown; Fifty Years Later, Still 
More Rhetoric Than Commitment, THE POST STANDARD/HERALD-JOURNAL, Apr. 15, 
2004 atA13. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
,. Id. 
If> Id. 
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 
1224, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2001), rev'd, 377, F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, 395 
F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. Feb. 1,2005) [hereinafter Parents Involved n. 
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neighborhoods that are noticeably segregated by race.17 Most of 
the city's white residents live in the northern, more affluent 
end of the city/8 whereas, "a majority of African American, 
Asian American, Hispanic American, and Native American 
residents live in the south.",9 Thus, a public school's districting 
program based on a student's geographic proximity to the 
school would mirror the racial isolation evident in Seattle's 
neighborhoods.20 
After Brown, courts around the country ordered school dis-
tricts to desegregate while Seattle's school board voluntarily 
explored options to ensure that students had access to diverse 
schools with equal opportunities!! For example, in 1998, the 
School District employed an "open choice" policy to assign stu-
dents to its ten public high schools.22 This policy gave students 
and their parents the opportunity to choose their preferred 
high schools!3 However, as expected, when students ranked 
their top choices, a disproportionate number of students chose 
the more prestigious schools!' The school board decided that in 
order to allow all students access to the more popular schools, 
they would employ a tiebreaker system, which elevated race 
over a student's geographic proximity, and a lottery to deter-
mine which students were assigned to the more prestigious 
schools. 25 
!7 Id. at 1225. 
18 Id. 
19Id. "74.2 percent of the [School District'sl Asian students, 83.6 percent of its 
black students, 65.0 percent of its Hispanic students, and 51.1 percent of its Native 
American students live in the southern half of the city. By contrast, 66.8 percent of the 
[School District'sl white student population lives in the northern half of the city." 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 377 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 
2004), reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2005), !hereinafter Parents In-
volved 11]. 
20 Parents Involved 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1225. 
21Id. 
22 Id. at 1226. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. "Approximately 82 percent of students selected one of the oversubscribed 
high schools as their first choice, while only about 18 percent picked one of the under-
subscribed high schools as their first choice." Parents Involved 11,377 F.3d at 955. The 
variation in schools was measured by factors such as "standardized test scores, num-
bers of college preparatory and Advanced Placement (AP) courses offered and the 
availability of an Internal Baccalaureate (IB) program, percentages of students taking 
AP courses and SATs, percentages of graduates who attend college, Seattle Times col-
lege-preparedness rankings, University of Washington rankings, and disciplinary sta-
tistics." Id. at 954 (footnote omitted). 
25 Parents Involved 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226. 
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The first tiebreaker admitted students whose siblings al-
ready attended the oversubscribed school. 26 This tiebreaker 
accounted for roughly "15 percent to 20 percent of high school 
assignments.'l27 If the school was still oversubscribed, the pol-
icy allowed for the second tiebreaker, which elevated race over 
proximity!S The School District adopted this controversial tie-
breaker to diversify schools that were deemed to be racially 
isolated!9 The School District determined that a school was 
racially "out of balance" if it "deviates by more than fifteen per-
cent from the overall racial breakdown" of the students attend-
ing Seattle's public schools. 30 At the time, white students ac-
counted for forty percent of the city's schools. 31 The student's 
race was specified on the registration fonn which was filled out 
by a parent in person."2 If the parent chose not to identify a 
racial category, the School District would assign a category 
based on the parent's appearance:3 
Next, if the school was still oversubscribed after using the 
racial tiebreaker, then the School District applied a third tie-
breaker:' This tiebreaker determined admittance based on 
geographic proximity to the school.35 If the first three tiebreak-
ers continued to keep the school over-subscribed, then the 
School District employed a· random lottery as the final tie-
breaker:6 
A non-profit corporation, Parents Involved in Community 
Schools, filed suit over the School District's "open choice" pol-
icy. The non-profit corporation was "fonned by parents whose 
children have been or may be denied admission to the high 
schools of their choosing solely because of race."3' It alleged 
that the School District's use of race engaged in illegal racial 
discrimination prohibited by the Washington Civil Rights Act, 
26 Parents Involved II, ·377 F.3d at 955. 
27Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226. 
31Id. 
32 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 955. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 956. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. The lottery "rarely [was] invoked because distances [were] calculated to 
one hundredth of a mile for purposes of the [third] tiebreaker." Id. 
37 Id. 
4
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.38 
This Note examines the Ninth Circuit decision in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Num-
ber 1.39 The introduction provides an overview of the evolution 
of race-based jurisprudence.·o In addition, the introduction de-
scribes the "open choice" policy established by the School Dis-
trict. 41 Part I explains the progression to strict scrutiny as the 
applicable standard of review for race-conscious admissions 
policies.·2 Part II analyzes the procedural history of the Parents 
Involved cases." Part III compares the admissions policies be-
tween public high schools and universities." Part IV proposes a 
constitutionally permissible race-conscious placement policy for 
secondary education!· Part V concludes that although the 
Ninth Circuit correctly held that the School District's "open 
choice" policy was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, future cases may require a more 
extensive examination of the differences between high school 
and university admissions, especially under the latest policies 
outlined in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.·s 
I. BACKGROUND 
Historically, discrimination based on race involved "dis-
crete and insular" minorities.·7 For this reason, the applicable 
authority and standard of review for discrimination against the 
white majority entailed many years of debate:8 
38 [d. 
39 See infra notes 172-254 and accompanying text. 
'" See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
41 See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 47-171 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 172-254 and accompanying text . 
.. See infra notes 255-285 and accompanying text . 
.. See infra notes 286-316 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 317-320 and accompanying text. 
" See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) . 
.. See infra notes 70-171 and accompanying text. 
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A. THE HISTORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 
Racial discrimination claims are often brought under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'· One purpose of Title VI was 
to permit the Executive Branch to terminate federal funding of 
private programs that unlawfully used race-based discrimina-
tion.50 In pertinent part, it provides that, "No person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance. "51 It was meant to 
"assure the existing right to equal treatment" when utilizing 
federal funds. 52 
In addition, racial discrimination claims are brought under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmenea 
Initially, the Supreme Court's position on the Fourteenth 
Amendment was that it had "one pervading purpose."54 That 
purpose was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and 
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the 
newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those 
who had formerly exercised dominion over him."55 While the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was fre-
quently used by the Supreme Court to defend property and the 
liberty of contract, the Equal Protection Clause remained dor-
mant.56 During this period, "the United States became a Nation 
of minorities."57 As a result, the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment no longer attached to equality rights for only one 
racial minority. 58 Accordingly, the Court has instated three 
" See id, 438 U.S. at 328-42. 
60 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328-29 (1978) (plurality 
opinion) [hereinafter Bakke]. 
51 [d. at 328 n.7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d» . 
• 2 [d. at 330. 
63 [d. at 291 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36, 71 (1873». The Four-
teenth Amendment commands, "No State shall ... deny to any person within itsjurisdic-
tion the equal protections of the laws." [d. at 289 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1) 
(alteration in original) . 
.. [d. 
56 [d. 
56 [d. at 291-92 . 
• 7 [d. at 292. 
68 [d. 
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standards of review to analyze claims under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 59 
B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR VARIOUS EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAIMS 
The three standards of review recognized by the Supreme 
Court to test alleged equal protection violations are rational 
basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny:o Rational 
basis is the least demanding level of scrutiny used to analyze 
equal protection violations.6l Courts utilize this level of review 
when the classification being discriminated against has not 
been elevated to a "suspect class."62 To satisfy rational basis, 
the legislation must serve a legitimate government purpose.63 
The next level of review is intermediate scrutiny.6' Discrimina-
tion based on gender is scrutinized under this standard of re-
view.65 In order to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, legislation 
must serve an important governmental purpose that is sub-
stantially related to the goal. 66 Traditionally, laws that classify 
people differently based on race are examined under the most 
exacting level: strict scrutiny.67 To satisfy strict scrutiny, the 
legislation must serve a compelling governmental interest that 
59 See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text. 
60 Id. 
6l See generally Goesaert v. Cleary, 74 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Mich. 1947) (involving 
a 1948 law that prohibited women from being bartenders, unless the bar was operated 
by her husband or father), affd, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190 (1976). The Court used rational basis for gender discrimination at this time. 
Id. at 738. 
62 See generally Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (declining to make gender a 
"suspect class"). 
63 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
64 See generally Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (raising the level of scrutiny from rational 
basis to intermediate scrutiny for discrimination against either gender). 
65 Id. 
56 Id. 
67 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1944) (involving a con-
viction under the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause for violating a military 
order during World War II that excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from desig-
nated West Coast areas), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2a, 102 Stat. 903 
(1988); Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303, 304, 306 (1880) (concerning a black defen-
dant convicted of murder by a jury from which blacks had been excluded); Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 356, 369 (1886) (involving a law that prohibited the operation of 
a laundry in wooden buildings without a permit that in application discriminated 
against Chinese applicants). 
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is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.68 Although strict 
scrutiny is now the applicable standard of review for race-
conscious affirmative action policies, the debate ensued for 
many years:9 
C. CASE HISTORY 
1. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
The first affirmative action case before the Supreme Court 
was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.70 The suit 
challenged the admissions program at the University of Cali-
fornia at Davis Medical School (hereinafter "U.C. Davis"), 
which was designed to admit a fixed number of minority appli-
cants.7I A majority of justices could not agree on the applicable 
standard of review." As a result, the decision was published 
with six separate opinions. 73 The Court was split, with Justice 
Lewis Powell in the middle. 74 Four justices, including Chief 
Justice Burger, concluded that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 prohibited U.C. Davis's program.76 This view avoided 
addressing the constitutional issue altogether.76 Justice Powell 
concurred in the judgment that the U.C. Davis program should 
be prohibited.77 However, he reached his conclusion through a 
constitutional analysis. 78 The remaining four justices dis-
sented.79 These dissenting justices agreed with Justice Powell 
68 [d. 
69 See infra notes 70-171 and accompanying text. 
70 See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
71 [d. at 269-70 (Powell, J. plurality opinion). 
72 [d. at 271-72 (Powell, J. plurality opinion). 
73 [d. Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun 
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. [d. at 324. 
Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun each filed separate opinions. 
[d. 380-421. Justice Stevens concurred in judgment and dissented in part and fIled an 
opinion that Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist joined. [d. at 
325-379. 
7. [d. (Powell, J. plurality opinion). 
75 [d. at 325 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, 
Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stevens concluded that Title VI prohibited U.C. Davis's 
program. [d. 
76 [d. (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
77 [d. at 325-26 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
76 [d. 
79 [d. at 325 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice 
Marshall, and Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Powell that a constitutional 
analysis was appropriate. [d. at 324. 
8
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that ''Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race 
than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'o However, unlike Powell, the dissent analyzed the V.C. 
Davis program under intermediate scrutiny and upheld it as a 
constitutional use of race.'l Justice Powell's opinion provided 
crucial guidelines in the affirmative action arena because his 
vote was necessary to obtain a majority."' 
Nevertheless, V.C. Davis undeniably used a race-based 
classification in its admissions program.sa The Court previously 
decided racial and ethnic minorities of any sort were inherently 
suspect and therefore called for the "most exacting judicial ex-
amination."" Allen Bakke was a white male applicant who was 
denied admission both in 1973 and 1974."5 V.C. Davis argued 
strict scrutiny was not the applicable standard of review be-
cause white males are not a "discrete and insular minority.''''6 
In spite of this, Justice Powell concluded that the Court had 
never required such a distinction before subjecting racial pref-
erences to strict scrutiny.87 Accordingly, Justice Powell deter-
mined Allen Bakke was entitled to a judicial determination of 
whether V.C. Davis's policy was "precisely tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest."" 
Vsing strict scrutiny review, Justice Powell first deter-
mined what interests were involved and which interests were 
substantial enough to support the use of a suspect classifica-
tion."· He found that the "special admissions program [at V.C. 
80 [d. at 325. A majority of the Court after this point views Title VI as coexten-
sive with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. [d. at 352-53. 
81 [d. at 325-26 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
82 See id., 438 U.S. 265 (plurality opinion). 
83 [d. at 289 (Powell, J.). The program at the U.C. Davis Medical School set up a 
committee to evaluate students who wished to be considered "economically and lor 
educationally disadvantaged" applicants. [d. at 273 n.1. No formal definition of "dis-
advantaged" was given. [d. A specified number of positions were reserved for disad-
vantaged applicants (16 out of 100). [d. at 289. The committee would present its "top 
choices to the general admissions committee." [d. at 275. In 1973, the "total number of 
special applicants was 297, of whom 73 were white," while. "[iJn 1974, 628 persons 
applied to the special committee, of whom and 172 were white." [d. at 274-75 n.5. 
84 [d. at 291 (Powell, J.) (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 
(1943), Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 323 (1944» . 
.. [d. at 276 (Powell, J.). 
86 [d. at 288 (Powell, J.). 
87 [d. at 290 (Powell, J.) (citing Carolene Prods. Co,. 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4). 
86 [d. at 299 (Powell, J.). 
89 [d. at 305-06 (Powell, J.). 
9
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Davis] purports to serve the purposes of: (i) reducing the his-
toric deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical 
schools and in the medical profession; (ii) countering the effects 
of societal discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of physi-
cians who will practice in communities currently underserved; 
and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an 
ethnically diverse student body.-
Justice Powell concluded that Brown and the subsequent 
desegregation cases demonstrated that remedying specific acts 
of racial discrimination was a judicial and state commitment.9 ! 
However, remedying specific acts of past discrimination is "far 
more focused" than remedying past societal discrimination, 
because societal discrimination involves reparations for society 
as a whole.92 Justice Powell determined that the Court has 
never allowed a preferential classification that assists members 
of one group while harming individuals of another without "ju-
dicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional 
or statutory violations.rna Thus, without such findings there is 
no "compelling justification" to discriminate based on race.94 As 
a result, Justice Powell concluded that if an institution's moti-
vating purpose was to remedy past specific acts, as opposed to 
broad societal discrimination, such a purpose could be found 
compelling.95 
The third stated purpose was to improve health care ser-
vices in communities where they were underserved.96 Powell 
concluded that in some situations this purpose would be "suffi-
ciently compelling."97 Even so, Bakke's record failed to show 
that U.C. Davis's special admissions program was designed to 
promote that goal.98 
90 [d. at 306 (Powell, J.). 
9! [d. at 307 (Powell, J.). 
92 [d. (Powell, J.). Remedying past societal discrimination involves a goal of 
"reparation by the 'majority' to a victimized group as a whole." [d. at 306 nA3 (Powell, 
J.). 
93 [d. at 307 (Powell, J.) (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367-76 
(1977); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1977); S. Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)). 
'" [d. at 309 (Powell, J.). 
so See id. at 307-10 (Powell, J.). 
96 [d. at 310 (Powell, J.). 
97 [d. (Powell, J.). 
96 [d. (Powell, J.). 
10
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The last purpose asserted by U.C. Davis was to establish a 
diverse student body.99 Justice Powell concluded that although 
achieving a diverse student body was sufficiently compelling to 
consider race in admissions decisions under certain circum-
stances, the particular special admissions program at U.C. 
Davis did not pass strict scrutiny review because it did not em-
ploy the least restrictive means. lOO Therefore, he invalidated 
the U.C. Davis program under the Equal Protection Clause. 101 
In summary, Justice Powell found racial diversity to be a 
compelling aspect of educational admissions decisions. l02 How-
ever, race is only one element in a range of factors a university 
may consider in attaining its goals of a diverse student body.l03 
Nonetheless, because of the division among the Court, the only 
holding from Bakke was that a "[s]tate has a substantial inter-
est that legitimately may be served by a properly devised ad-
missions program involving the competitive consideration of 
race and ethnic origin. mo. Despite Powell's constitutional 
analysis, the majority authorized the use of affirmative action 
in Bakke, but they did not permit the quota program that U.C. 
Davis established. l05 As a result, the applicable standard of re-
view for affirmative action programs remained a debate for 
more than a decade. IOG 
.. [d. at 311 (Powell, J.). 
100 [d. at 319-20 (Powell, J.). 
101 [d. (Powell, J .). 
102 [d. at 314 (Powell, J.) 
103 [d. Powell held that Harvard College's admissions policy was an adequate 
program. [d. at 316-24. "Harvard College expanded the concept of diversity to include 
students from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups." [d. at 316. The 
admissions policy at Harvard used race as a factor, but did not allow "target quotas." 
[d. 
104 [d. at 320 (Powell, J.). 
100 [do. at 271 (Powell, J.). 
106 See generally United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (holding a negoti-
ated consent decree including numerical hiring in promotional goals for minority em-
ployees was permissible); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 
U.S. 421 (1986) (fmding minority hiring goals permissible after defendants were found 
guilty of engaging in discriminatory practices); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 
U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that a collective bargaining agreement that required the re-
tention of probationary minority teachers when nonminority teachers were laid offwas 
not permissible); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a federal pro-
gram reserving a specified percentage of government contracts for minority contrac-
tors), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
11
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2. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 
The Supreme Court also analyzed race-conscious hiring 
procedures. 107 A majority of the Supreme Court in Richmond u. 
J.A. Croson Company determined that the applicable standard 
of review for state law was strict scrutiny. 108 The questionable 
plan in Croson required the city's prime contractors to "subcon-
tract at least 30% of the [contract's] dollar amount to one or 
more Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs)."109 The Court 
held that "the Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the oppor-
tunity to compete for a [specified] percentage of public con-
tracts based solely upon their race."110 The Court agreed with 
the plurality view in Wygant u. Jackson Board of Education 
that "the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause 
was not [determined] by the race of those burdened or bene-
fited by the particular classification."lll 
In addition, the Court decided strict scrutiny was used to 
"smoke out illegitimate uses of race" by ensuring the legislation 
was necessary, therefore justifying the use of a ''highly suspect 
tool. ""2 Thus, they chose to use strict scrutiny as the applicable 
standard of review. 113 Accordingly, the Court in Croson held 
that the city failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in ap-
portioning their contracts based on race."' 
3. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen a 
The Supreme Court also addressed the applicable standard 
of review for federal equal protection violations. 115 Adarand 
107 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
lOB [d. at 493-95. 
109 [d. at 477. The Richmond Plan considered a business an MBE if at least fifty-
one percent of the business was owned or controlled by minority group members. [d. at 
478. The Richmond Plan defined "minority group members" as United States citizens 
"who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." [d. The 
dispute arose because the J.A. Croson Co. alleged that it was denied work on a city 
project because it was not an MBE. [d. at 483. 
110 [d. at 493. 
III [d. at 494 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 285-86 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). In Wygant, four members of the Court applied heightened scrutiny to a race-
based system of employee layoffs. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270. ("Societal discrimination, 
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy"). 
112 Croson at 493. 
113 [d. 
114 [d. at 505. 
11. See generally Adarand, 515 U.S. 200. 
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Constructors, Inc. v. Pena involved the "Federal Government's 
practice of giving general contractors on Government projects a 
financial incentive to hire subcontractors controlled by 'socially 
and economically disadvantaged individuals.'"116 "Race-based 
presumptions" were used to determine who was socially or eco-
nomically disadvantaged.1I7 The Court in Adarand made it 
clear that federal racial classifications, like those of a state, 
must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be 
narrowly tailored to further that interest. liB Consequently, the 
Court determined that all government-imposed racial classifi-
cations "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 
scrutiny. "119 
D. THECOURTANNOUNCESTHESTANDARD 
During its 2003 term the Supreme Court decided two cases 
which upheld the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams. l2O Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger are signifi-
cant because their rulings set up constitutional parameters for 
affirmative action programs at colleges and universities all 
over the country.12l 
1. Grutter v. Bollinger 
In Grutter, the University of Michigan School of Law (here-
inafter "Law School") sought a "mix of students with varying 
backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from 
116 Id. at 204. The clause addressing the financial incentive stated that "'the 
contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals 
include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Ameri-
cans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to be disadvantaged ... ." Id. at 
205 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 687(d)(2), (3)). 
117 Adarand at 204. Adarand was a Colorado-based highway construction com-
pany who submitted the low bid for a federal contract. Id. at 205. The Central Federal 
Lands Highway Division (CFLHD), a part of the United States Department of Trans-
portation (DOT), was the prime contractor. Id. Adarand alleged that the race-based 
presumptions used in compensating contractors violated of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Id. at 210. 
118 Id. at 227. 
119Id. 
1" Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding University of Michigan 
School of Law's admissions policy), reh'g denied, 539 U.S. 982 (2003); Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (finding University of Michigan's College of Literature, Sci-
ence, and Arts undergraduate admissions program was unconstitutional). 
121 See infra notes 122-171 and accompanying text. 
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each other."'22 Consequently, the Law School wanted to comply 
with the Supreme Court's only ruling involving race in univer-
sity admissions, which was articulated in Bakke. '23 Barbara 
Grutter was a white Michigan resident who applied to the Law 
School in 1996.'2• She alleged that the Law School discrimi-
nated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.'25 
The Law School considered several factors when admitting 
students. 126 Among those factors were each applicant's under-
graduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admis-
sions Test (LSAT) score. 127 However, the admissions officials 
also considered a series of "soft variables.'''28 These variables 
included, "enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the un-
dergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant's essay, 
and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selec-
tion."'29 The purpose of the "soft variables" was to help evaluate 
the applicant's "likely contributions to both the intellectual and 
social life of the institution.'''30 As a result, the admissions pol-
icy confirmed the Law School's longstanding commitment to 
racial diversity, without defining diversity solely in terms of 
race. '3' 
According to the Director of Admissions, the Law School 
tried to achieve a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority 
students.'32 He further testified that there was not a specified 
percentage of minority students that the school was seeking to 
admit. 133 However, he did "frequently consult the 'daily re-
ports'" which monitored the racial and ethnic composition of 
selected students to "ensure that the 'critical mass' of under-
represented minority students would be reached."'3. "Critical 
122 Grutter. 539 U.S. at 314. 
123 [d. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265). 
124 [d. at 316. 
n' [d. at 317. 
126 [d. at 315. 
127 [d. 
128 [d. 
129 [d. 
lao [d. 
131 [d. at 315. 
132 [d. at 318. 
133 [d. 
134 [d. 
14
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mass" was not a specified number, but rather a number that 
was large enough to encourage underrepresented minority stu-
dents to participate without feeling isolated. 135 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dis-
agreement among the Courts of Appeal. 136 First, the Court de-
cided whether there was a compelling governmental interest 
underlying the policy behind the Law School's admissions pro-
gram.137 The Court deferred to the Law School in assessing 
whether diversity was essential to its educational mission. 138 
Accordingly, it found the benefits of the admissions policy pro-
moted a "'cross-racial understanding'," which broke down 
stereotypes, and allowed students a greater understanding of 
people of different races. 139 These benefits created a "livelier, 
more spirited" class discussion as well as "better prepare[d] 
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society."14o 
As a result, the Court held that admitting a "'critical mass' of 
underrepresented minorities [was] necessary to further [the 
Law School's] compelling interest in securing the educational 
benefits of a diverse student body.m41 
Next, the Court examined whether the policy was narrowly 
tailored to achieve its compelling interest. 142 In doing so, it fol-
lowed the narrow tailoring principles laid out in Powell's Bakke 
opinion. 143 In Bakke, the Court struck down the use of a quota 
system to achieve racial diversity, because it would "insulate 
each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications 
from competition with all other applicants.m44 Instead, the 
Court articulated that the admissions program must be flexi-
135 [d. at 319. 
136 [d. at 321-22. (fmding that the District Court applied strict scrutiny and de-
termined the admissions policy was unlawful). The court determined that the Law 
School's interest in compiling a diverse student body was not compelling, because 
Bakke did not authorize the promotion of a diverse classroom as a permissible interest. 
[d. at 321. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment and held that 
Justice Powell's opinion with respect to diversity was the controlling rationale. [d. at 
32l. 
137 [d. at 327. The issue was "[wlhether diversity is a compelling interest that can 
justifY the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission to public 
universities." [d. at 322. 
136 [d. at 328. 
139 [d. at 330. 
140 [d. 
141 [d. at 333. 
142 [d. 
143 [d. at 334 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J.)). 
144 [d. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J.)). 
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ble, possibly using race as a "plus" factor, but the elements of 
diversity should be considered in light of all of the qualifica-
tions of each applicant. 145 
Under the reasons set forth in Justice Powell's opinion in 
Bakke, the Court in Grutter concluded that the Law School did 
not operate the "critical mass" policy as a quota. I46 It reasoned 
that "some attention to numbers," will not convert an already 
"flexible admissions [policy] into a rigid quota.»!47 Again, the 
Court emphasized that a race-conscious admissions policy must 
be flexible enough to ensure that race will not be the determin-
ing factor in the application.I48 
Based on the above analysis, the Court determined that 
the Law School's admissions policy did not automatically admit 
students according to anyone of the "soft variables.»!4> In addi-
tion, the Court found that the policy did not provide any prede-
termined or mechanical "bonuses" merely on the basis of an 
applicant's race. 150 In fact, the Court found that the Law 
School's program was sufficiently similar to the Harvard Plan 
described by Powell in Bakke. 151 As such, the Court determined 
that the policy was "flexible enough to consider all pertinent 
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of 
each applicant to place them on the same footing for considera-
tion, although not necessarily according them the same 
weight.m52 
The Court also decided that the Law School earnestly con-
sidered race-neutral alternatives to its program. I5a The District 
Court had criticized the Law School for failing to consider al-
ternatives such as a random lottery or decreasing the weight of 
undergraduate grades and admission test scores. I54 Nonethe-
less, the Supreme Court found these alternatives required a 
"dramatic sacrifice of diversity" and the academic quality of all 
admitted students. 155 In addition, the Court trusted the Law 
140 Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.)). 
146 Id. at 335. 
147 Id. at 336 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323 (Powell, J.)). 
148 Id. at 337. 
1<
9 Id. 
ISO Id. 
151 Id.; see infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
152 Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.)). 
153 Id. at 340. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
16
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School to terminate its race-conscious admissions policy upon 
developing a satisfactory race-neutral alternative.15s The Court, 
therefore, held that "the Equal Protection Clause does not pro-
hibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admis-
sions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining 
education benefits that flow from a diverse student body.»!·7 
2. Gratz v. Bollinger 
In the same term that the Supreme Court decided Grutter, 
it granted certiorari in Gratz v. Bollinger to determine whether 
racial preferences in the University of Michigan's admissions 
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.158 The 
Court, upon the same type of objections to the admissions pol-
icy as in Grutter, decided that the University of Michigan's Col-
lege of Literature, Science, and the Arts's (hereinafter "LSA") 
admissions program violated constitutional and statutory pro-
visions against race-based decision-making.159 LSA's admis-
sions policy and the Law School's admissions policy differed 
significantly. ISO 
A critical distinction between the two admissions policies 
was the numeric guideline for admitting students based on ra-
cial preferences. lSI LSA's program automatically awarded "un-
derrepresented" applicants twenty points. ,s2 Its sole considera-
tion for determining whether students were underrepresented 
was a review ofthe application to determine whether the appli-
cant belonged to a minority.,s3 In addition, distributing twenty 
points accounted for one-fifth of the total points necessary for 
admission. IS. 
Moreover, the twenty points awarded to underrepresented 
applicants represented a racial classification. ,s5 The Court, 
156 Id. at 343. 
157Id. 
168 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249. 
159 Id. at 250. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 270. 
162Id. at 271-72. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 270. 
165 See id. 
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therefore, applied strict scrutiny. 166 Once more, the Court 
looked to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke for guidance. 167 
Bakke emphasized that an admissions program involving race 
or ethnic backgrounds is permissible when race is considered a 
"plus" in the applicant's file. 16s The system also should be flexi-
ble enough to consider "all pertinent elements of diversity in 
light ofthe particular qualifications of each applicant." 169 LSA's 
program did not offer applicants the individualized selection 
process described in Powell's Bakke opinion. 170 Thus, the Court 
in Gratz held that because LSA's use of race in its admissions 
policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity, its as-
serted interest, the admissions policy, would not survive strict 
scrutiny.l7l 
II. APPLICATION IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
The Supreme Court's analysis in both Grutter and Gratz 
created the parameters the Ninth Circuit utilized when it de-
cided Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District Number 1.172 
A. DISTRICT COURT 
First, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington had to determine the standard of review 
for analyzing alleged equal protection violations. 173 The court 
decided that because the School District's "open choice" policy 
relied on racial classifications, it had to use strict scrutiny to 
determine its constitutionality.17' The school board considered 
the benefits of a more diverse student body to establish its pur-
pose.175 It determined the benefits from diversity included in-
166 [d. Under a strict scrutiny standard, LSA's admissions program could only use 
race to further a compelling governmental interest by narrowly tailored means. [d. 
167 [d. 
166 [d. at 270-71 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.)). 
169 [d. at 27l. 
170 [d. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.)). 
171 [d. at 275. 
172 See infra notes 188-254 and accompanying text. 
173 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 
1224, 1232 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
225-26 (1995)). 
174 [d. 
17. [d. 
18
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creasing classroom discussion of racial and ethnic issues, 
"teaching students to become citizens of a multi-raciaVmulti-
ethnic world," and allowing for different perspectives absent 
from a diverse classroom atmosphere.176 
Consequently, the District Court found that the School 
District's interests were not only to promote diversity, but also, 
to ameliorate the de facto effects of residential segregation in 
Seattle.177 Without such a policy, the court felt the school sys-
tem would revert back to highly segregated schools due to the 
disproportionate distribution of race throughout Seattle's 
neighborhoods. 17s As such, the court decided that preventing re-
segregation was a compelling interest. 179 Accordingly, when the 
District Court analyzed Bakke, it found that Justice Powell's 
opinion was not as forceful when considering racial preferences 
earlier in a child's education. ISO The court, therefore, held that 
the School District met their burden in establishing that the 
"open choice" policy furthered a compelling governmental in-
terest.ISI 
Next, the District Court considered whether the program 
was narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of reducing racial iso-
lation resulting from de facto segregation. ls2 It decided the plan 
did not mandate a specific quota, because it allowed for a fif-
teen percent deviation from the sixty/forty nonwhite to white 
ratio before race was taken into account. IS' The court also found 
the School District limited the racial tiebreaker by only apply-
ing it to ninth graders. IS. Moreover, the racial tiebreaker ter-
minated once an entering class was racially "in balance.ms5 The 
court, therefore, concluded that the "open choice" policy was 
narrowly tailored to further compelling interests and granted 
176Id. (quoting and citing School District's Mins. of Exec. Sess. of Bd. of Directors, 
Nov. 17, 1999). 
177 Id. at 1236. 
176 Id. at 1235. 
179 Id. at 1237. 
160 Id. at 1235 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 
16 (1971) (fInding that "[slchool authorities are traditionally charged with broad power 
to formulate and implement educational policy", even possibly prescribing a racial 
proportion within a school that reflects society). 
161 Id. at 1236. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 1239. 
184 Id. 
I .. Id. 
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the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the 
state and federal law claims.ls6 Subsequently, the non-profit 
corporation Parents Involved In Community Schools ap-
pealed. ls7 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY 
Parents Involved II was then reviewed by the Ninth Circuit 
to determine whether the School District's "open choice" policy 
violated of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. lss The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District 
Court that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of re-
view. lS9 In addition, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the School 
District satisfied its burden articulating a compelling interest 
for the use of a racial classification. 190 
In doing so, it relied heavily on Grutter and Gratz to ana-
lyze whether the School District's diversity interest was com-
pelling. 19l The School District wanted to achieve several objec-
tives with the implementation of its "open choice" policy!92 It 
emphasized that diversity in schools better prepares students 
for a multi-racial world by increasing racial and ethnic discus-
sions involving diverse perspectives. 193 Consequently, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that although Grutter examined the diver-
sity interests of a university environment, the decision was also 
applicable to high schools. 19' The court found no substantial 
difference in the government's interest in providing diverse 
interactions among eighteen year-old high school seniors and 
186 Id. at 1240. 
187 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 953. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 960. 
180 Id. at 964. 
191 Id. at 961-64. 
192 Id. at 961. The School District desired to achieve: "the educational benefits of 
attending a racially and ethnically diverse school; integration of schools which, as a 
result of housing patterns and the tendency of many parents to choose schools close to 
home, would otherwise tend to become racially isolated; ensuring that public institu-
tions are open and available to all segments of American society; alleviating de facto 
segregation; increasing racial and cultural understanding; avoiding racial isolation; 
fostering cross-racial friendships; and reducing prejudice and increasing understanding 
of cultural differences." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
193 Id. at 961. 
194 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 964 (emphasis added) (quoting Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 330). 
20
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eighteen year-old college freshmen. '•5 Accordingly, it decided 
the benefits of a diverse classroom were "as compelling in the 
high school context as they are in higher education.!!!·B Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit majority concluded that the School District's 
diversity interest was a constitutionally accepted compelling 
interest. '•7 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the reme-
dying of de facto segregation from Seattle's housing patterns a 
compelling interest. lOB However, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
the Supreme Court has never held remedying past discrimina-
tion as the only use of racial preferences that could withstand 
strict scrutiny. I.. As a result, the court concluded the compel-
ling interest was the benefit created from the presence of racial 
and ethnic diversity in educational institutions!OO Thus, the 
School District could employ a race-conscious placement policy 
if its means to diversify were narrowly tailored. 201 
The Ninth Circuit used several governing constraints to 
determine whether the School District's "open choice" policy 
utilized the least restrictive means.202 First, the court prohib-
ited mechanical racial quotas for non-remedial purposes!03 Ac-
cordingly, the policy had to be flexible enough to evaluate each 
applicant's potential diversity contributions individually:o, 
195 Id. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The 'educational 
benefit' that the University seeks to achieve by racial discrimination consists, accord-
ing to the Court, of 'cross-racial understanding' and 'better preparation of students for 
an increasingly diverse workforce and society,' all of which is necessary not only for 
work, but also for good 'citizenship.' This is not, of course, an 'educational benefit' but 
the same lesson taught to people three feet shorter and twenty years younger in insti-
tutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens." (alterations 
omitted) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331)). 
196 Id. 
107 Id. at 964. 
198 Id. at 961. 
199 Id. at 962 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (O'Connor, J.)). 
200 Id. at 964. 
201Id. 
202 Id. at 968-69 (taking the six constraints from "Grutter and Gratz" and "well-
established narrow tailoring principles~) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. 
244). 
203 Id. at 968 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 293 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) 
("Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke rules out a racial quota or set-aside, in which race is 
the sole factor of eligibility for certain places in a class"); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334). 
204 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 968 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-74; Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 337-39; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 & 317-18; Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 345 (4th Cir. 2001); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 
798, 800 (lst Cir. 1998); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 
21
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Next, the court examined whether the School District earnestly 
considered race-neutral alternatives. 205 Then, even assuming 
the School District passed the first constraints, the court had to 
determine whether they minimized the adverse impact on third 
parties!06 Finally, the court determined whether the policy was 
time-limited. 207 
In the present case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
open choice policy failed nearly every test. 208 As a result, it re-
versed and enjoined the School District from using the racial 
tiebreaker.209 
1. Racial Quotas and a Flexible Nonmechanical Use of Race 
If an affirmative action policy is not seeking to remedy 
past discrimination, racial quotas are not permitted.210 Accord-
ing to Grutter, a racial quota is a program with a certain fixed 
number or proportion of opportunities that separates appli-
cants disallowing a comparison for all available seats. 211 Prohi-
bition of strict racial quotas will ensure that applicants are 
evaluated individually and that race is not a "defining feature" 
in their application.212 
The dissent in the Ninth Circuit opinion viewed quotas as 
irrelevant when assigning students to secondary schools!13 
Two reasons were cited to illustrate why cases involving higher 
learning did not provide a proper narrow tailoring model for 
secondary education!" First, based on a particular applicant's 
132-33 (4th Cir. 1999); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Ed., 195 F.3d 698,707 (4th Cir. 
1999)). 
2Q5 [d. at 969 (emphasis omitted) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337; Wygant v. Jack-
son Ed. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1985); Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706; Podbersky v. 
Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 160-61 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
206 [d. (emphasis omitted) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 
287 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bakke, 438 U.s. at 308, 
311,314-15 (Powell, J., concurring); Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 798). 
207 [d. (emphasis omitted) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342; Richmond v. J. A. Cro-
son Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989); Hayes v. N. State Law Enforcement Ass'n, 10 F.3d 
207,216 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
206 [d. at 969. 
209 [d. at 976 n.32, 988-89. 
210 [d. at 968 (emphasis omitted) (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 293 (Souter & Gins-
burg, JJ., dissenting); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334). 
211 [d. at 969 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (citations and quotations omitted)). 
212 [d. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337). 
213 [d. at 999 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
214 [d. at 998 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss1/5
2005] DNERSITY IN SEATTLE 73 
merit, a higher learning institution grants or denies access to 
that limited government benefit!'· However, when racial pref-
erences are used, race is a substitute for merit!'6 Second, 
higher education seeks "true diversity" for an advanced aca-
demic atmosphere, whereas public high schools seek different 
educational benefits that are more suitably accomplished with 
an explicit determination based on race.2l7 Nevertheless, the 
Ninth Circuit majority determined that the School District's 
racial tiebreaker was "virtually indistinguishable from a pure 
racial quota. '>218 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit determined the policy was not 
flexible. 2l> According to the court, racial preferences for pur-
poses of diversity must meaningfully be evaluated in "light of 
all pertinent factors.'''2o "Automatically awarding a fixed racial 
preference" based solely on race disallows the "far broader ar-
ray of diversity characteristics" from influencing the state's 
diversity goals. 221 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded the School 
District's racial tiebreaker could not be narrowly tailored to 
any purpose other than outright racial balancing:22 
2. Consideration of Race-Neutral Alternatives 
The Ninth Circuit also concluded the School District did 
not earnestly consider race-neutral alternatives!23 Although 
the School District was presented with such alternatives, the 
Ninth Circuit majority decided the school board did not ade-
quately weigh its options.224 
215 [d. at 999 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
216 [d. at 999 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
217 [d. (Graber, J., dissenting). 
218 [d. 
219 [d. 
220 [d. at 968 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-74, 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337-39; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315, 317-18 (Powell, J.); Belk v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 345 (4th Cir. 2001) (Traxler, J., concur-
ring); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 798, 800 (lst Cir. 1998); Eisenberg v. Mont-
gomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 132-33 (4th Cir. 1999); Tuttle v. Arlington 
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999». 
221 [d. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.». The School District used a 
"computer algorithm designed to implement the ceilings and floors framing its racial 
tiebreaker." [d. at 969. 
222 [d. at 970. 
223 [d. 
224 [d. at 970. 
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The first proposed alternative was a citywide lottery.225 A 
lottery system would require a "dramatic sacrifice" in student 
choice, geographic convenience and program specialization:'· 
In Grutter, the Court rejected a demand that the Law School 
had to consider a lottery because the Law School might not 
achieve its diversity goal due to an underrepresentation of 
various types of diversity.227 Consequently, such a program 
would "necessarily diminish the quality of its admitted stu-
dents."22B Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit majority distin-
guished the School District's policy because it was compulsory 
to place all students in a Seattle public high school.229 The ap-
plicant pool, therefore, would not be subject to the same type of 
"demographic skew" that could occur with the Law School.230 In 
addition, the quality of students in the School District would 
not be diminished because merit is not a consideration in stu-
dent placement.231 As a result, the majority determined that 
the reasons the Law School in Grutter was permitted to elimi-
nate the use of a lottery did not exist for the School District!32 
Thus, the School District should have given greater considera-
tion to a citywide lottery:33 
The second proposed race-neutral alternative focused on 
factors, other than race, known to the School District .• 34 One 
specific example looked at the student's socioeconomic status.235 
Using this type of criterion instead of race would foster cross-
class as well as cross-racial integration!36 The Ninth Circuit 
... [d. at 970. 
226 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 861 (2004) 
(citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340). Jefferson County Public Schools "maintained an 
integrated school system under a 1975 federal court decree. After release from the 
decree ... the [district) elected to ... [use) a managed choice plan [with) broad guide-
lines" to continue integration. [d. at 836. This case arose because students and par-
ents felt the 2001 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. [d. 
227 [d. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340). 
22B [d. 
229 [d. at 971 (emphasis omitted). 
230 [d. 
231 [d. 
= [d. 
233 [d. 
234 [d. at 971 (stating that possible usable data included: "whether a child lives at 
home or in 'an agency'; if she lives at home, with whom; whether the child's home and 
most proficient languages are English or some other language; and the child's eligibil-
ity for free or reduced price lunch"). 
235 [d. at 972. 
236 [d. 
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determined a diversity-oriented policy that did not rely solely 
on race was a viable option that should have been considered 
more extensively.237 
The third alternative considered by the Ninth Circuit ma-
jority was to enhance the quality of all schools.238 Such a plan 
would potentially attract a more diverse "cross-section" of stu-
dents to less popular schools.239 The court determined the 
School District was presented with an especially thoughtful 
proposal addressing the dilemma in Seattle.240 Consequently, it 
determined the School District did not give the proposal ade-
quate consideration.241 As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
the School District did not adequately consider race-neutral 
alternatives.242 
3. The Adverse Impact on Third Parties 
The School District also had to make serious efforts to 
minimize the adverse impacts on third parties stemming from 
its racial tiebreaker in order to satisfy the second prong of the 
strict scrutiny analysis. 243 The Ninth Circuit majority found the 
School District was not minimizing the impact of the non-
preferred students because the fifteen-percent deviation from 
Seattle's racial construction could have been larger!" It de-
cided that an expansion of the band to plus or minus twenty 
'137 [d. at 971-72. 
238 [d. at 973. 
2:l9 [d. Such a plan would focus on "educational organization, teacher quality, 
parent-teacher interaction, raising curricular standards, substantially broadening the 
availability of specialized and magnet programs, ... and supporting extra-curricular 
development." [d. 
240 [d. at 973-74. The School District was presented with a proposal from the 
Urban League. [d. at 973. The "Urban League convened a working group" to develop a 
proposal for the School District in response to Parent's filing the lawsuit. [d. at 973. 
The group included, among others, "a representative from the NAACP, one of the Par-
ents, a former member of the School Board, a retired high school principal, the then-
current President of the Seattle Council Parent Teacher Student Association (PTSA), 
and a former PTSA President." [d. 
241 [d. at 973-74. 
242 [d. at 970. 
243 [d. at 969 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 
U.S. 267, 287 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 311, 314-15 (Powell, J.); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 798 (1st Cir. 
1998». 
244 [d. at 975. 
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percent would not make a significant difference in achieving its 
goals.2'. 
However, the extent of the impact on third parties is prem-
ised on the fact that every student denied his or her choice suf-
fers a significant constitutional burden. 2.6 All the students are 
equally subject to denial of their first choice school; therefore 
all students are on equal footing.2" Accordingly, each student is 
allowed to attend one of the district's ten public high schools, 
regardless of race.2'S Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined the racial tiebreaker did not minimize the adverse im-
pacts on third parties.2'9 
4. The Policy is Time-Limited 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded the use of the racial 
tiebreaker was time-limited. 250 A termination point assures all 
citizens that preferential treatment based on race is temporary 
and only used to assist the goal of equality.25! When a school in 
the Seattle School District became "racially balanced" accord-
ing to the aforementioned deviation percentages, the racial tie-
breaker was automatically terminated.2•2 In Grutter, the Su-
preme Court decided merely to take the Law School at its word 
that the race-conscious program would be terminated as soon 
as practicable.253 Under that standard, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded the time-limit was the only criterion that the School 
District satisfied. 254 
mId. 
246 Id. at 1012 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
247Id. (Graber, J., dissenting). "There is no right under Washington law to attend 
a local school or the school of the student's choice." Id. at 1012-13 (Graber, J., dissent-
ing). 
246 Id. (Graber, J., dissenting). 
249Id. at 975. 
250 Id. at 969 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342; Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 510 (1989); Hayes v. N. State Law Enforcement Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 216 (4th 
Cir. 1993». 
251 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion». 
252Id. 
253 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 . 
... Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 976 n.32. 
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III. COMPARISON BETWEEN HIGH SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS 
77 
The Supreme Court's analysis in Grutter and Gratz implies 
that diversity may be a "'constitutional predicate' for race-
conscious affirmative action programs in areas outside of 
higher education."255 When deciding Parents Involved II, the 
Ninth Circuit applied the Grutter and Gratz analysis to high 
schools in the same manner the Supreme Court did with higher 
education.256 However, high schools and universities do not 
have the same policies and interests.257 Consequently, reliance 
on Grutter and Gratz is necessary, but application of the law 
must be adapted to account for differences between high school 
and university admissions.258 
A. INTERESTS IN A DIVERSE STUDENT BODY 
The diversity interest for high schools is arguably different 
from that of higher education. 259 For example, high schools 
share the university's diversity goals to some extent, such as 
"diversity of viewpoint and background."260 However, those 
goals are not the sole or primary interests for a public high 
schooL261 Nonetheless, they may be for a university.262 High 
schools have a simpler objective: teaching children to interact 
with peers of different races. 263 Accordingly, diversity in earlier 
education is essential to enable students to be racially tolerant 
through "cross-racial relationships. "264 
2M Joint Statement of Constitutional Law Scholars, Reaffirming Diversity: A 
Legal Analysis of the University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., 1, 3 (2003) [hereinafter Reaffirming Diversity] 
(referring to the Court's statements in Grutter such as "benefits of aft1rmative action 
are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that the 
skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through 
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints"). 
256 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 964. 
257 Reaffirming Diversity, supra note 255, at 23. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 991 (Graber, J., dissenting) (citing Comfort v. 
Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 381 n.90 (D. Mass. 2003)). 
261Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 1001 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
264 Id. at 991 (Graber, J., dissenting) (quoting Comfort, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 381 
n.90). 
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Although both the Law School and the School District 
wanted to promote "tolerant, productive, and well-adapted 
members of this racially diverse society," the Law School also 
sought to enhance the academic environment so its students 
would become accomplished, well-rounded lawyers:65 Both the 
Supreme Court in Grutter and the Ninth Circuit in Parents 
Involved II decided that diversity was a compelling interest for 
educators.26B Nevertheless, exactly what that interest is may 
determine what the proper analysis should entail. It is uncer-
tain whether a compelling interest for secondary education 
should be examined in the same manner as a compelling inter-
est for higher education. As a result, the analysis relies heavily 
on both the stated interest and the level of education to which 
it is applied. 
B. DETERMINATION BASED ON MERIT 
The use of merit in admissions is a major distinction be-
tween high schools and universities. A university admits ap-
plicants largely based on their merit.267 Such an institution 
strives to create an elite and a highly selective educational en-
vironment. 26B Alternatively, public high schools do not evaluate 
a student's merit during placement.269 If a school's admissions 
program is based on merit, then it is sensible to disallow auto-
matic admittance based on race because race can simply be 
weighed with the merit evaluation. However, when analyzing 
a non-merit based public high school's race-conscious admis-
sions policy, it is more difficult to establish a program not de-
termined by race.270 Even when diversity is found to be a com-
pelling governmental interest in high schools, "choice-based 
programs will have greater difficulty falling within the exam-
ple of the Law School because of the absence of merit based 
admissions. "271 As a result, this distinction should not be over-
... Id. at 993 (Graber. J., dissenting). 
21!6 See supra notes 157, 197 and accompanying text. 
267 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 998-99 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
268 See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text. 
269 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 998-99 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
27°Id. at 999 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
271 Wendy Parker, The Legal Cost of the "Split Double Header" of Gratz and Grut-
ter, 31 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587,603 (2003). 
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looked when determining whether a race-conscious admissions 
policy violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
C. IMPACT OF RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS POLICIES 
Higher academic achievement is an important goal at 
every level of education. Breaking down stereotypes and 
prejudices is also important at each stage in life; however, fa-
cilitating interracial interactions at a younger age enables stu-
dents to enter higher education having already combated such 
problems.272 Therefore, the exchange of ideas that are so impor-
tant in higher education will have already been facilitated by 
interracial interactions during earlier education!73 
Many other benefits also arise when a secondary educator 
attempts to diversify a school:" For example, the scholastic 
achievement of minority students will be higher in integrated 
schools. 275 In addition, minority students "develop higher edu-
cational and occupational aspirations that can translate into 
greater effort and achievement.'>276 Conversely, university stu-
dents are already striving to increase their educational aspira-
tions. Furthermore, interracial interactions among peers will 
increase the likelihood that interracial friendships will form.277 
These friendships will reduce prejudice and stereotypes.27a Re-
cent research shows that "only a desegregated and diverse 
school can offer such opportunities" to form "early school ex-
periences in breaking down racial and cultural stereo-types.''''79 
Moreover, these interactions also have been shown to "improve 
citizenship, increase political participation, and foster volun-
teering.mao 
Nevertheless, negative impacts also stem from the use of 
race in admissions. In Bakke, Justice Powell reasoned that the 
"use of racial classifications to desegregate schools was funda-
Z72 Id. at 853. 
Z73Id. 
Z74 Derek Black, The Case for the New Compelling Governmental Interest: Im-
proving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C.L. REV. 923, 950 (2002). 
Z75Id. 
Z76 Id. at 951. 
Z77 Id. 
Z79 Id. 
Z79 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 992 n.9 (Graber, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted). 
280 Black, supra, note 274, at 952. 
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mentally different from the selective admissions context be-
cause, in the school assignment context, 'white students were 
not deprived of an equal opportunity for education.""81 In addi-
tion, he noted that the situation was very different from bus-
sing students to comparable schools in different neighborhoods 
in compliance with court ordered desegregation!8' The Medical 
School in Bakke did not arrange for applicants to attend a dif-
ferent university in order to desegregate; without admission to 
U.C. Davis, the applicant may have been denied a medical edu-
cation altogether!83 Alternatively, educational opportunities at 
public high schools are interchangeable!8' Thus, if students are 
not placed in the school of their choice, they will still be placed 
in another public high school. .85 For that reason, the negative 
impact on a third party from a race-conscious admissions policy 
in higher learning is potentially more severe than an "open 
choice" policy at a public high school. 
IV. PROPOSED RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS POLICY 
Every race-conscious admissions policy in education is gov-
erned by the law set out in the Grutter and Gratz opinions!86 
Nevertheless, strict adherence to their standards should be 
adapted according to the proposed policy!8' For example, the 
"open choice" policy that Seattle's School District devised was 
not narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling interests; there-
fore it was not constitutionally permissible!88 However, some 
changes to the School District's policy may satisfy the parame-
ters set forth in Grutter and Gratz!8' 
A. INDIVIDUALIZED ANALYSIS 
First, recognition of the Supreme Court's previous deci-
sions regarding the use of race in admissions will provide help-
281 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301 n.39. 
282 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 1001 n.25 (Graber, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301 n.39). 
283 Id. (Graber, J., dissenting) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301 n.39). 
284 Reaffirming Diversity, supra note 255, at 23. 
285 Id. 
286 See supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text. 
287Id. 
288 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 988. 
289 See supra notes 120-171 and accompanying text. 
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ful guidelines.29o The admissions program in Bakke set aside 
sixteen out of one hundred seats for minority students.291 LSA's 
program in Gratz awarded twenty points to every underrepre-
sented minority.292 Both are rigid numeric standards that do 
not allow for any individual examination regarding race.293 
Conversely, in Grutter, the Law School admitted a "critical 
mass" of minority applicants, which was found constitutionally 
permissible.294 "Critical mass" was not quantified in terms of 
numbers or percentages.295 Instead, the Law School simply 
sought to prevent underrepresented students from feeling iso-
lated.296 In all three cases, the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of selecting students based on their individual qualifica-
tions.297 
Merit, however, is a large part of an individualized selec-
tion process for higher education, as illustrated in the constitu-
tionally sound policies used by U.C. Davis, the Law School, and 
LSA.298 Consequently, the opportunity to evaluate students in-
dividually is diminished when merit is not a consideration for 
admittance:99 Nonetheless, an individualized examination for 
high school student placement cannot be eliminated:oo 
As a result, the School District must evaluate more than 
one factor, disallowing for anyone of these factors to be deter-
minative!O' The first three tiebreakers should not be utilized 
individually!02 Instead, each factor - sibling attendance, race, 
and geographic proximity - should be used as a "plus" factor:03 
Under these circumstances, placement will not be based solely 
on race.304 
290 See supra notes 70-171 and accompanying text. 
291 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275. 
292 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. 
293 See supra notes 291-292 and accompanying text. 
294 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318 . 
... Id. at 318-19. 
296 Id. 
297 See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 71,127-130,167-170 and accompanying text. 
299 Parents Involved II at 999 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
300 See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text. 
301 Parents Involved II at 968 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 293 (Souter & Ginsburg, 
JJ., dissenting». 
302 See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text. 
aoa Id. 
304 Id. 
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B. CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS RACES INDEPENDENTLY 
Also, the race-conscious policy must consider each race in-
dependently. Acknowledging the wide range of diversity char-
acteristics attributed to different races is essential. Otherwise, 
the program will not maximize diversity benefits and will not 
minimize adverse impacts on third parties. 305 For example, the 
School District failed to acknowledge the diversity differences 
among each "nonwhite" race."06 The racial tiebreaker was im-
plemented when the school's racial makeup deviated by fifteen 
percent from the white versus nonwhite ratio."07 The School 
District did not distinguish beyond Blacks, Asians, Latinos, 
Native Americans, or any other demographic to determine if a 
school was out of balance."08 It, therefore, disregarded the vari-
ous contributions students of different minorities would bring 
to the classroom. As a result, a school district cannot maximize 
diversity without considering potential diverse contributions 
from different ethnic groups. 
C. SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AS A FACTOR 
Factors other than race can also contribute to a diverse 
educational atmosphere.309 Socioeconomic status is one such 
factor."lo Using socioeconomic status as a factor in admissions 
would encourage interactions among financially diverse stu-
dents.3\1 A student's perspective develops from his lifestyle, 
which is influenced by income, as well as by racial and ethnic 
background.312 Thus, an evaluation of both criteria would allow 
a more individualized examination of each student's likely con-
tributions to the intellectual and social life of the school.313 
305 See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
306 See Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 955. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. at 985-86. 
309 See supra note 234-237 and accompanying text. 
31°Id. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. 
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D. QUALITY OF ALL SCHOOLS 
Increasing the quality of all the schools within a school dis-
trict is important. The problem with oversubscription stems 
from the reality that public high schools are not equa1.3U 
Eliminating the gross disparities in the quality of education 
among the schools will reduce the dependence on the need for a 
racial tiebreaker.3l5 Improving organization, teacher quality, 
and broadening special programs are a few examples of 
changes that will increase the quality of education at each 
school. 316 In spite of this, these improvements involve time and 
capital. As a result, improving the quality of education is a 
long term goal and will not immediately satisfy the need for a 
race-conscious admissions policy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Parents Involved II under-
standably relied on the Supreme Court's most recent decisions 
involving affirmative action in education, Grutter and Gratz.317 
Although the outcome was correct under the circumstances, the 
majority failed to acknowledge the various distinctions between 
public high school placements and university admissions. Di-
versifying an academic environment is a compelling interest for 
all education.3l8 Nevertheless, the specific interest and the least 
restrictive means to achieve that interest may differ according 
to the level of education. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized the need to examine 
each applicant individually when using racial preferences as 
part of any evaluation.3l9 However, without a merit-based ad-
missions policy, public high schools have less opportunity to 
focus on individual characteristics. Regardless, a public high 
school can still weigh other factors simultaneously with race, 
encouraging a more individualized examination of students. 
Although the Ninth Circuit should have considered the dispari-
ties between university admissions and high school place-
314 See Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 1008 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
315 See id. 
316 Id. at 973. 
317 See supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text. 
318 See supra notes 157, 197 and accompanying text. 
819 See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text. 
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ments, Seattle's "open choice" policy did not utilize the least 
restrictive means to achieve its compelling interest, thus mak-
ing the policy unconstitutional.320 Nevertheless, the next chal-
lenged policy before the Ninth Circuit may pose additional is-
sues regarding race-conscious admissions. 
KATIE YORK 
320 See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text . 
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